根據(jù)《2000財(cái)政年度國(guó)防授權(quán)法》第1202款關(guān)于“中華人民共和國(guó)年度軍事力量報(bào)告”的規(guī)定,國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)應(yīng)每年提交一份報(bào)告“關(guān)于中國(guó)的當(dāng)前及未來軍事戰(zhàn)略,報(bào)告中應(yīng)針對(duì)目前和今后20年人民解放軍的可能的軍事技術(shù)的發(fā)展,中國(guó)的安全戰(zhàn)略和軍事戰(zhàn)略,以及軍事組織和作戰(zhàn)觀念.
Section 1202, “Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “on the current and future military strategy of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”
China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element of today’s strategic environment – one that has signifi cant implications for the region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their country, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power might be used.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fi ghting and winning short-duration, highintensity confl icts against high-tech adversaries – which China refers to as “l(fā)ocal wars under conditions of informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at present, remains limited but, as noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and fi eld disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.”China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of U.S. intervention, appears to be an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating capabilities for other regional contingencies, such as confl ict over resources or territory. The pace and scope of China’s military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of China’s armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic capabilities have ramifi cations far beyond the Asia Pacific region.China’s strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31 intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. China’s counterspace program – punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – poses dangers to human space fl ight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China’s continued pursuit of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefi eld to include space and cyber-space. The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired endstates of the PLA’s expanding military capabilities. China’s actions in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above offi cially disclosed fi gures. This lack of transparency in China’s military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.作者: 牧童 時(shí)間: 2007-5-31 23:41
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Key Developments 1
Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 6
Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15
Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25
Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30
Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36
Refl ecting increasing concerns over energy and resource needs, 2006 saw the largest annual increase in new energy contracts signed by China, including new agreements with Saudi Arabia and several African countries. China’s effort to court African nations in 2006 culminated with a November summit in Beijing attended by 40 heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53 African nations.
In March 2006, China formally launched its 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which includes ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2010, a doubling of China’s 2000 GDP by 2010, and an overall GDP of $4 trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated development, and greater investment and urbanization in the rural interior, to address income disparities and social unrest.
Offi cial reports claim the number of “mass incidents” declined 22 percent in 2006. Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly at local policies and offi cials, refl ect continued popular dissatisfaction with offi cial behavior related to property rights and forced relocations, labor rights, pensions, pollution, corruption, and police brutality.
China responded to North Korea’s ballistic missile launches over the Sea of Japan in July and nuclear test in October by voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 and by continuing efforts to use diplomatic means, specifi cally the Six Party Talks, which China hosts, to address North Korea’s nuclear programs. The Talks, which involve the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and North Korea, as well as China, produced agreement in February 2007 on initial steps to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
The visit of new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to China in November helped to ease somewhat tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. However, issues such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, and China’s efforts to block Japan’s quest for a seat on the UN Security Council remain sources of friction.作者: 牧童 時(shí)間: 2007-5-31 23:43
2006年10月,中國(guó)人民解放軍海軍的宋級(jí)柴油電力潛艇,在日本近海的小鷹號(hào)航母附近露出水面在. 這一事件表明,必須長(zhǎng)期努力,提高美國(guó)和中國(guó)的軍用飛機(jī)和海軍在彼此靠得很近時(shí)的安全性. 2006年 這些努力產(chǎn)生了兩個(gè)分期雙邊搜索及拯救演習(xí) (一期在美國(guó)海岸,二期在中國(guó)沿海) .
In October 2006, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy SONG-class diesel-electric submarine broached the surface in close proximity to the USS KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier in waters near Japan. This incident demonstrated the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military air and maritime assets operating near each other. In 2006, these efforts produced a two phased bilateral search and rescue exercise with the PLA Navy (one phase off the U.S. coast, the second off the PRC coast).
In 2006, China conducted two counterterrorism exercises with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) partners, and hosted the fi fth anniversary of the founding of the SCO in Shanghai in June.
China is increasing its role in the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The United States has encouraged this increased participation, and cooperated with China to co-chair an ARF seminar on nonproliferation. During the October 2006 ASEAN Summit, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao proposed expanded security and defense cooperation between China and ASEAN.
In November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao made the fi rst visit to India by a PRC head of state in ten years, demonstrating the importance China places on improving ties with India while preserving its strategic relationship with Pakistan.
China is pursuing long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities for power projection, anti-access, and area denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for offensive Taiwan Strait contingencies, China deploys its most advanced systems to the military regions directly opposite Taiwan.
China is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading qualitatively certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
By October 2006, China had deployed roughly 900 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan, expanding at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year. Newer versions of these missiles have improved range and accuracy.
China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. The road-mobile, solid-propellant DF-31 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and will likely achieve operational status in the near future, if it has not already done so. A longer range variant, the DF-31A, is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007. China is also working on a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2 (IOC 2007-2010), for deployment on a new JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, also in development.
China continues to explore the use of ballistic and cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including counter-carrier and land attack, and is working on reconnaissance and communication systems to improve command, control, and targeting.
China’s naval forces include 72 principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines, about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
China received the second of two Russianmade SOVREMENNYY II guided missile destroyers (DDG) in late 2006. These DDGs are fi tted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wide-area air defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the earlier SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased from Russia.作者: 牧童 時(shí)間: 2007-5-31 23:45
China is building and testing second-generation nuclear submarines with the JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and the SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarine, which began sea trials in 2005.
China took delivery of two KILO-class submarines from Russia, completing a contract for eight signed in 2002. China operates twelve KILOs, the newest of which are equipped with the supersonic SS-N-27B ASCM, and wireguided and wake-homing torpedoes.
The PLA Navy’s newest ship, the LUZHOUclass (Type 051C) DDG is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N- 20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a signifi cant improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense capability.
The LUZHOU-class DDG complements ongoing developments of the LUYANG I (Type 052B) and LUYANG II (Type 052C) DDGs. The LUYANG I is fi tted with the Russian SA-N-7B GRIZZLY SAM and the YJ-83 ASCM. The LUYANG II is fi tted with an air defense system based on the indigenous HHQ-9 SAM.
In 2006, China began producing its fi rst guidedmissile frigate (FFG), the JIANGKAI II (Type 054A). The JIANGKAI II will be fi tted with the medium range HHQ-16, a vertically launched naval surface-to-air missile currently in development.
At the 2006 Zhuhai Air Show, PRC military and civilian offi cials asserted China’s interest in building an aircraft carrier.
China has more than 700 combat aircraft based within an un-refueled operational range of Taiwan and the airfi eld capacity to expand that number signifi cantly. Many aircraft in the PLA force structure are upgrades of older models (e.g., re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges); however, newer aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the F-10 multi-role fi ghter to operational units. The F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be China’s premier fi ghter in the coming decades.
China is now producing the multi-role Su- 27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A) fi ghter under a licensed co-production agreement with Russia following an initial production run of Su-27SKs (F-11). China is employing increasing numbers of the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fi ghterbomber and its naval variant, the Su-30MK2.作者: 牧童 時(shí)間: 2007-5-31 23:48
Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly sophisticated array of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision munitions, and cruise missiles.
China’s fi rst indigenously produced attack helicopter, the Z-10, is undergoing fl ight testing. The Z-10 will fi re the Red Arrow 8E anti-tank guided missile, offering combat performance equal to the Eurocopter Tiger, but below that of the AH-64 Apache.
Improvements to the FB-7 fi ghter program will enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime maritime strike operations and use improved weapons such as the Kh-31P (AS-17) antiradiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided munitions.
In the next few years, China will receive its fi rst battalion of Russian-made S- 300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S- 300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic countermeasures. China also is developing the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile system, a phased array radar-based SAM with a 150 km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ-9) will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical launch naval SAM (HHQ-16) will deploy on the JIANGKAI II FFG.
China has about 1.4 million ground forces personnel with approximately 400,000 deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and additional artillery pieces. In April 2006, China made its fi rst delivery of the new third generation main battle tank, the ZTZ-99, to units in the Beijing and Shenyang military regions.
The PLA has deployed a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed a range of modifi cations for existing vehicles including fl otation tanks and mounted outboard engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have greater stability and performance in open water. Increased amphibious training, including multiple training evolutions in a single year, is building profi ciency among China’s amphibious forces.