《中國2007年度軍事報告》中英文對照版

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根據(jù)《2000財政年度國防授權(quán)法》向國會報告中華人民共和國的軍事力量
   
    根據(jù)《2000財政年度國防授權(quán)法》第1202款關(guān)于“中華人民共和國年度軍事力量報告”的規(guī)定,國防部長應(yīng)每年提交一份報告“關(guān)于中國的當(dāng)前及未來軍事戰(zhàn)略,報告中應(yīng)針對目前和今后20年人民解放軍的可能的軍事技術(shù)的發(fā)展,中國的安全戰(zhàn)略和軍事戰(zhàn)略,以及軍事組織和作戰(zhàn)觀念.
    Section 1202, “Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” of the　National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that　the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “on the current and future military strategy　of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future　course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets　and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy,　and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”
   
    內(nèi)容提要
   
    中國在區(qū)域性的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)實力的迅速崛起,以成為全球當(dāng)今戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境的一個重要因素,對本地區(qū)和世界發(fā)揮著重要影響. 美國歡迎出現(xiàn)一個和平與繁榮的中國,鼓勵中國作為一個負(fù)責(zé)任的國際利益,并對全球的健康與發(fā)展承擔(dān)更大的責(zé)任. 然而, 中國還有許多不確定性的未來,包括中國擴(kuò)充軍力,權(quán)力如何使用.
   
    中國人民解放軍,正在謀求全面轉(zhuǎn)型,由在其領(lǐng)土的陸軍大規(guī)模消耗戰(zhàn)爭，轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槟軌虼蜈A短期的, 高強度沖突，對付高技術(shù)對手--中國指為"局部戰(zhàn)爭條件下的信息化" 中國的軍事實力目前仍然有限,但是, 正如在2006年的四年國防報告中所講, 它"具有很大的潛力,在軍事上與美國的競爭,在未來時間可能抵消美國傳統(tǒng)的軍事優(yōu)勢. "
   
    中國短期內(nèi)的焦點是準(zhǔn)備在臺灣海峽的可能性軍事行動,包括美國的干預(yù), 看來是它現(xiàn)代化規(guī)劃一個重要的驅(qū)動. 不過,分析中國的軍事采購與戰(zhàn)略思維,表明北京也可能因為資源沖突或領(lǐng)土爭端，而在其它地區(qū)發(fā)生突發(fā)事件.
   
    中國的軍事轉(zhuǎn)型, 在發(fā)展速度和規(guī)模上,近年來一直在增長, 購買外國先進(jìn)武器,刺激了本國國防和科學(xué)技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè),而且對武裝部隊的改革影響深遠(yuǎn).中國軍隊日益擴(kuò)大的軍事能力,是改變東亞的軍事平衡的一個重要因素中國的戰(zhàn)略能力的改善所產(chǎn)生的影響遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了亞太地區(qū).
   
    中國戰(zhàn)略力量的現(xiàn)代化,是提高其戰(zhàn)略的打擊能力,例如東風(fēng)-31洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈, 2006年初取得了初步的威脅. 中國的太空計劃的標(biāo)志,是2007年1月成功試驗一種能直接攻擊衛(wèi)星的武器, 反衛(wèi)星武器對人類的航天飛行構(gòu)成了危險,并危及到所有空間航天的國家的資產(chǎn). 中國在繼續(xù)追求傳統(tǒng)的陸地,空中,海洋,以及空間和網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間的現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)場.
   
    外部世界有限的了解中國的軍事現(xiàn)代化的動機(jī),決策與關(guān)鍵能力. 中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人尚未充分解釋中國人民解放軍擴(kuò)充軍力的目的或預(yù)期目的. 中國的行動,在某些方面似乎越來越不符合其申明的政策. 中國實際的國防支出仍遠(yuǎn)高于官方公布的數(shù)字. 這種缺乏透明度的中國軍事事務(wù)自然會遭到國際社會的不理解和迅速的反應(yīng).
   
    China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element　of today’s strategic environment – one that has signifi cant implications for the region and the world. The　United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as　a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success　of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their　country, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power might be used.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed　for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fi ghting and winning short-duration, highintensity　confl icts against high-tech adversaries – which China refers to as “l(fā)ocal wars under conditions of　informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at present, remains limited but, as　noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with　the United States and fi eld disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military　advantages.”China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility　of U.S. intervention, appears to be an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of　China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating capabilities for other　regional contingencies, such as confl ict over resources or territory.　The pace and scope of China’s military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high　rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced　foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of China’s　armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic　capabilities have ramifi cations far beyond the Asia Pacific region.China’s strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31　intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. China’s counterspace　program – punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – poses　dangers to human space fl ight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China’s continued pursuit　of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the　modern battlefi eld to include space and cyber-space.　The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting　China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired endstates　of the PLA’s expanding military capabilities. China’s actions in certain areas increasingly appear　inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above offi cially　disclosed fi gures. This lack of transparency in China’s military affairs will naturally and understandably　prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.

monica

感謝樓主給我們帶來的軍事大餐.!3:

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Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly sophisticated array of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision munitions, and cruise missiles.
   
    China’s fi rst indigenously produced attack helicopter, the Z-10, is undergoing fl ight testing. The Z-10 will fi re the Red Arrow 8E anti-tank guided missile, offering combat performance equal to the Eurocopter Tiger, but below that of the AH-64 Apache.
   
    Improvements to the FB-7 fi ghter program will enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime maritime strike operations and use improved weapons such as the Kh-31P (AS-17) antiradiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided munitions.
   
    防空Air Defense.
   
    在未來幾年,中國將接收其俄制S- 300PMU-2型防空導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng). 有效射程達(dá)200公里, S- 300PMU-2提供了增加殺傷力的反戰(zhàn)術(shù)彈道導(dǎo)彈及更有效的電子對抗. 中國也正在發(fā)展國產(chǎn)HQ-9防空導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng),以相控陣?yán)走_(dá)為基礎(chǔ),射程為150公里. 如上所述, 海軍HHQ-9將部署于旅洋2型驅(qū)逐艦,垂直發(fā)射的SAM (HHQ-16)將部署于江凱2型護(hù)衛(wèi)艦 .
   
    In the next few years, China will receive its fi rst battalion of Russian-made S- 300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S- 300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic countermeasures. China also is developing the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile system, a phased array radar-based SAM with a 150 km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ-9) will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical launch naval SAM (HHQ-16) will deploy on the JIANGKAI II FFG.
   
    地面部隊Ground Forces
   
    中國有大約140萬人的陸軍部隊,其中約有40萬人部署在臺灣對面的三個軍區(qū). 中國一直在升級這些部隊的坦克,裝甲運兵車,以及更多的火炮. 2006年4月,中國第一次裝備了新的第三代主戰(zhàn)坦克, ZTZ-99,將裝備在北京軍區(qū)和沈陽軍區(qū).
   
    China has about 1.4 million ground forces personnel with approximately 400,000 deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and additional artillery pieces. In April 2006, China made its fi rst delivery of the new third generation main battle tank, the ZTZ-99, to units in the Beijing and Shenyang military regions.
   
    兩棲力量Amphibious Forces
   
    解放軍裝備了新的兩棲攻擊車(AAV) ,并將升級現(xiàn)有的車輛,包括兩棲坦克和突擊車輛. 其新型水陸兩棲車有更穩(wěn)定的性能. 同時增加兩棲訓(xùn)練,包括一年中的多種演習(xí)訓(xùn)練,這是一支正在建設(shè)中的兩棲力量.
   
    The PLA has deployed a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed a range of modifi cations for existing vehicles including fl otation tanks and mounted outboard engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have greater stability and performance in open water. Increased amphibious training, including multiple training evolutions in a single year, is building profi ciency among China’s amphibious forces.
   
    中國軍事學(xué)說的發(fā)展
   
    Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine
   
    中國將繼續(xù)把重點放在"信息化"的條件,提高綜合性的聯(lián)合行動, 聯(lián)勤和遠(yuǎn)程機(jī)動能力.
   
    2006年6月 解放軍推出了新的指導(dǎo),在演習(xí)中使用模擬器和假想敵,以提高實戰(zhàn)訓(xùn)練能力.
   
    2006年12月,中國人民解放軍第二炮兵,海軍,空軍和陸軍的軍事學(xué)院的領(lǐng)導(dǎo),簽訂了合作辦學(xué)協(xié)議,為聯(lián)合專業(yè)軍事教育鋪平了道路.

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China is building and testing second-generation nuclear submarines with the JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and the SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarine, which began sea trials in 2005.
   
    China took delivery of two KILO-class submarines from Russia, completing a contract for eight signed in 2002. China operates twelve KILOs, the newest of which are equipped with the supersonic SS-N-27B ASCM, and wireguided and wake-homing torpedoes.
   
   
    The PLA Navy’s newest ship, the LUZHOUclass (Type 051C) DDG is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N- 20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a signifi cant improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense capability.
   
    The LUZHOU-class DDG complements ongoing developments of the LUYANG I (Type 052B) and LUYANG II (Type 052C) DDGs. The LUYANG I is fi tted with the Russian SA-N-7B GRIZZLY SAM and the YJ-83 ASCM. The LUYANG II is fi tted with an air defense system based on the indigenous HHQ-9 SAM.
   
    In 2006, China began producing its fi rst guidedmissile frigate (FFG), the JIANGKAI II (Type 054A). The JIANGKAI II will be fi tted with the medium range HHQ-16, a vertically launched naval surface-to-air missile currently in development.
   
    At the 2006 Zhuhai Air Show, PRC military and civilian offi cials asserted China’s interest in building an aircraft carrier.
   
    空中力量Air Power
   
    中國目前已有超過700多架戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)能夠正常飛行,臺灣及其機(jī)場的容量將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)擴(kuò)大這一數(shù)字. 解放軍正在升級許多舊型號的飛機(jī)(例如,升級B-6轟炸機(jī)的引擎,以提高作戰(zhàn)范圍) ; 然而,新的飛機(jī)構(gòu)成了越來越大的百分比清單.
   
    中國人民解放軍空軍正在部署殲10多用途戰(zhàn)斗機(jī). 殲10是中國的第四代戰(zhàn)斗機(jī),將是中國在未來的數(shù)十年內(nèi)的第一戰(zhàn)斗機(jī).
   
    中國目前正在俄羅斯的合作生產(chǎn)協(xié)議下,生產(chǎn)蘇27SMK/FLANKER(F-11A)多用途戰(zhàn)斗機(jī). 中國正在生產(chǎn)越來越多的Su-30MKK/FLANKER多用途戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)及其變種的海軍蘇-30MK2.
   
    中國的戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)正裝備有一批日益精密的空對空和空對地武器,衛(wèi)星和激光制導(dǎo)的精確彈藥和巡航導(dǎo)彈.
   
    我國第一部自行研制的攻擊直升機(jī),直- 10正在試飛. 直- 10將配備紅箭8E反坦克導(dǎo)彈,其作戰(zhàn)能力相當(dāng)于歐洲的虎式,但在美國的AH-64阿帕奇直升機(jī)之下.
   
    改善FB-7戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)的計劃將使這型舊飛機(jī)能夠執(zhí)行夜間海上攻擊行動,并使用改良武器,例如Kh-31P(AS-17)反輻射導(dǎo)彈和KAB-500激光制導(dǎo)導(dǎo)彈.
   
    China has more than 700 combat aircraft based within an un-refueled operational range of Taiwan and the airfi eld capacity to expand that number signifi cantly. Many aircraft in the PLA force structure are upgrades of older models (e.g., re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges); however, newer aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory.
   
    The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the F-10 multi-role fi ghter to operational units. The F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be China’s premier fi ghter in the coming decades.
   
    China is now producing the multi-role Su- 27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A) fi ghter under a licensed co-production agreement with Russia following an initial production run of Su-27SKs (F-11). China is employing increasing numbers of the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fi ghterbomber and its naval variant, the Su-30MK2.

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中國正在探索使用彈道導(dǎo)彈和巡航導(dǎo)彈執(zhí)行反介入任務(wù)，這其中包括反航母和戰(zhàn)術(shù)攻擊，而且中國一直在致力于偵察和通信系統(tǒng)的研制以獲得更好的指揮、控制和瞄準(zhǔn)能力。
   
    China is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading qualitatively certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
   
    By October 2006, China had deployed roughly 900 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan, expanding at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year. Newer versions of these missiles have improved range and accuracy.
   
    China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. The road-mobile, solid-propellant DF-31 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and will likely achieve operational status in the near future, if it has not already done so. A longer range variant, the DF-31A, is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007. China is also working on a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2 (IOC 2007-2010), for deployment on a new JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, also in development.
   
    China continues to explore the use of ballistic and cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including counter-carrier and land attack, and is working on reconnaissance and communication systems to improve command, control, and targeting.
   
    海軍實力Naval Power.
   
    中國海軍包括72艘主要軍艦,大約58艘攻擊潛艇,以及約50艘中型和重型兩棲艦艇,大約41艘沿海導(dǎo)彈巡邏艇.
   
    中國在2006年年底獲得了第二批兩艘現(xiàn)代級2型導(dǎo)彈驅(qū)逐艦. 這些驅(qū)逐艦配備反艦巡航導(dǎo)彈(ASCMS),也使防空系統(tǒng)有了改善.現(xiàn)代級驅(qū)逐艦是早些時候中國從俄羅斯購進(jìn)的.
   
    中國正在建設(shè)和試驗的第二代核潛艇, 包括晉級(094型)核動力導(dǎo)彈潛艇以及商級 (093型)核動力攻擊潛艇，其中后者于2005年開始試航.
   
    中國已接收兩艘基洛級潛艇, 至此2002年中俄約定的關(guān)于8艘潛艇的交易已經(jīng)全部完成. 中國擁有12艘基洛級潛艇, 它們當(dāng)中最新的一些裝備有超音速SS-N-27B 反艦導(dǎo)彈,以及線導(dǎo)和尾流自導(dǎo)魚雷.
   
    解放軍海軍最新軍艦, 是旅洲級(051C型)防空驅(qū)逐艦. 它配備為俄羅斯SA-N-20 SAM系統(tǒng)控制的TOMBSTONE相控陣?yán)走_(dá). SA-N-20能夠使解放軍海軍防空體系得到顯著的改善, 提高中國的艦載防空能力.
   
    旅洲級驅(qū)逐艦?zāi)軌蜓a充正在發(fā)展的旅洋級( 052B型)和旅洋2( 052c型)驅(qū)逐艦 . 旅洲級驅(qū)逐艦配備有俄羅斯SA-N-7B GRIZZLY SAM和YJ-83 ASCM. 旅洋2驅(qū)逐艦則在同一防空系統(tǒng)的基礎(chǔ)上,配備國產(chǎn)的HHQ-9 SAM.
   
    2006年,中國開始下水第一艘導(dǎo)彈護(hù)衛(wèi)艦(FFG),江凱2( 054A型) . 江凱2將裝有正在發(fā)展的HHQ-16中程垂直發(fā)射防空導(dǎo)彈.
   
    在2006年珠海航展上,中國軍方和文職官員宣稱中國有興趣興建一艘航空母艦.
   
    China’s naval forces include 72 principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines, about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
   
    China received the second of two Russianmade SOVREMENNYY II guided missile destroyers (DDG) in late 2006. These DDGs are fi tted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wide-area air defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the earlier SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased from Russia.

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2006年10月,中國人民解放軍海軍的宋級柴油電力潛艇,在日本近海的小鷹號航母附近露出水面在. 這一事件表明,必須長期努力,提高美國和中國的軍用飛機(jī)和海軍在彼此靠得很近時的安全性. 2006年 這些努力產(chǎn)生了兩個分期雙邊搜索及拯救演習(xí) (一期在美國海岸,二期在中國沿海) .
   
    In October 2006, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy SONG-class diesel-electric submarine broached the surface in close proximity to the USS KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier in waters near Japan. This incident demonstrated the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military air and maritime assets operating near each other. In 2006, these efforts produced a two phased bilateral search and rescue exercise with the PLA Navy (one phase off the U.S. coast, the second off the PRC coast).
   
    2006年,中國先后與上海合作組織( SCO )的成員國進(jìn)行了兩次反恐怖演習(xí), 上海合作組織第五屆周年紀(jì)念日將于六月在上海召開.
   
    In 2006, China conducted two counterterrorism exercises with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) partners, and hosted the fi fth anniversary of the founding of the SCO in Shanghai in June.
   
    中國正在增加其在亞太經(jīng)濟(jì)合作組織( APEC ),東南亞國家聯(lián)盟(東盟) 與東盟區(qū)域論壇( ARF )的作用 . 美國鼓勵這種參與率的提高,并與中方共同主持了東盟關(guān)于防擴(kuò)散問題. 在2006年10月東盟首腦會議上,中國總理溫家寶建議擴(kuò)大中國與東盟在安全和防務(wù)領(lǐng)域的合作.
   
    China is increasing its role in the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The United States has encouraged this increased participation, and cooperated with China to co-chair an ARF seminar on nonproliferation. During the October 2006 ASEAN Summit, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao proposed expanded security and defense cooperation between China and ASEAN.
   
    2006年11月,中華人民共和國主席胡錦濤首先對印度進(jìn)行訪問,這是10年來中國國家元首對印度的首次訪問, 充分表明了中國政府在保持與巴基斯坦的戰(zhàn)略同時,改善與印度的關(guān)系.
   
    In November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao made the fi rst visit to India by a PRC head of state in ten years, demonstrating the importance China places on improving ties with India while preserving its strategic relationship with Pakistan.
   
    中國的軍事力量發(fā)展
   
    Developments in China’s Military Forces
   
    中國奉行的長期的,全面的改造它的軍事力量,以提高其軍事能力.符合臺海有事時,短期集中精力攻取臺灣, 中國在各軍區(qū)部署的其最先進(jìn)的系統(tǒng),直接面對著臺灣.
   
    China is pursuing long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities for power projection, anti-access, and area denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for offensive Taiwan Strait contingencies, China deploys its most advanced systems to the military regions directly opposite Taiwan.
   
    彈道和巡航導(dǎo)彈Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
   
    中國正在發(fā)展和試驗進(jìn)攻性導(dǎo)彈,形成額外的導(dǎo)彈部隊,提升了某些導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)和開發(fā)方法的質(zhì)量,以對付美國彈道導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng).
   
    到2006年10月,中國已臺灣對面部署了大約900移動CSS-6和CSS-7短程彈道導(dǎo)彈, 并且以大約每年100枚的速度增加. 而且新型號的射程和精度都有提高.
   
    中國的現(xiàn)代化遠(yuǎn)程彈道導(dǎo)彈武力,加入了更多的本國系統(tǒng). 采用固體燃料的陸基機(jī)動的東風(fēng)-31型洲際遠(yuǎn)程彈道導(dǎo)彈在 2006年初步形成威懾能力, 并且可能或者已經(jīng)具備實戰(zhàn)能力. 射程更遠(yuǎn)的東風(fēng)-31A ,預(yù)計在2007年達(dá)到初始作戰(zhàn)能力. 中國正在制訂一項新的潛射彈道導(dǎo)彈, 巨浪-2，預(yù)計于2007到2010間獲得初始戰(zhàn)斗能力. 這種導(dǎo)彈將會配備于同樣也處于發(fā)展中的094型晉級戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)彈核潛艇上.

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在2006年最大的年度新能源所簽訂的合約中,反映了日益關(guān)注的能源和資源的需求,包括同沙特阿拉伯和幾個非洲國家的新的協(xié)定. 中國努力使得中國與非洲國家在2006年的合作達(dá)到高潮, 11月的首腦會議在北京由非洲53個國家中的40個國家的元首以及8個國家的代表出席.
   
    Refl ecting increasing concerns over energy and　resource needs, 2006 saw the largest annual　increase in new energy contracts signed by China,　including new agreements with Saudi Arabia　and several African countries. China’s effort to　court African nations in 2006 culminated with　a November summit in Beijing attended by 40　heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53　African nations.
   
    2006年3月,中國正式開展的第11個五年計劃( 2006-2010年),其中包括雄心勃勃的計劃20 %降低能耗,每單位國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值) 2010年增加了一倍,中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值到2010年比2000年番一番,整體國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值4萬億美元,到2020年. 該計劃強調(diào)和諧發(fā)展,加強在農(nóng)村的投入,解決收入差距和社會動蕩.
   
    In March 2006, China formally launched its 11th　Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which includes　ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in　energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic　Product (GDP) by 2010, a doubling of China’s　2000 GDP by 2010, and an overall GDP of $4　trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated　development, and greater investment and　urbanization in the rural interior, to address　income disparities and social unrest.
   
    官方的報告稱, 在2006年完成"群眾性事件"下降22 % . 不過,在這些事件中,主要是針對地方政策以及官員, 持續(xù)反映了民眾對財產(chǎn)權(quán)利和強迫遷移,勞動權(quán)益,養(yǎng)老金腐敗和警察的暴行的不滿.
   
    Offi cial reports claim the number of “mass　incidents” declined 22 percent in 2006.　Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly　at local policies and offi cials, refl ect continued　popular dissatisfaction with offi cial behavior　related to property rights and forced relocations,　labor rights, pensions, pollution, corruption, and　police brutality.
   
    中國的區(qū)域發(fā)展與戰(zhàn)略
   
    Developments Related to China’s Regional　Strategy
   
    中國對于朝鮮在7月日本海上空發(fā)射的彈道導(dǎo)彈,和10月的核試驗,投票支持聯(lián)合國安理會1695號和1718號的決議,繼續(xù)努力使用外交手段, 具體來說,六方會談是中國的解決朝鮮的核問題的計劃. 會談中,包括美國,日本,韓國,俄羅斯和朝鮮,以及中國等簽署協(xié)議, 2007年2月初步執(zhí)行2005年9月的聯(lián)合聲明,即朝鮮半島無核化.
   
    China responded to North Korea’s ballistic missile launches over the Sea of Japan in July and nuclear test in October by voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 and by continuing efforts to use diplomatic means, specifi cally the Six Party Talks, which China hosts, to address North Korea’s nuclear programs. The Talks, which involve the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and North Korea, as well as China, produced agreement in February 2007 on initial steps to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
   
    日本新首相安倍晉三在11月的訪問中國之行,有助于緩解東京與北京之間的緊張關(guān)系.然而,諸如在東海的領(lǐng)土糾紛,對尖閣/釣魚臺群島的歸屬問題,中國努力阻止日本爭奪一個聯(lián)合國安理會常任理事國席位,是導(dǎo)致雙方的摩擦根源.
   
    The visit of new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to China in November helped to ease somewhat tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. However, issues such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, and China’s efforts to block Japan’s quest for a seat on the UN Security Council remain sources of friction.

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Table of Contents
   
    Chapter One: Key Developments 1
    Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 6
    Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15
    Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25
    Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30
    Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36

[ 本帖最后由 牧童 于 2007-6-2 00:07 編輯 ]